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Trading Aggressiveness and Market Eciency
Abstract
Stein (2009) shows that crowding by sophisticated traders can cause price overre-
action. To test Stein's theory, this paper uses trading aggressiveness after earnings
releases as a measure of crowding. With a large number of traders, their strong aggre-
gate demand makes trade execution more dicult, and leads every individual investor
to trade more aggressively. I nd that prices of aggressively traded stocks overreact after
good news, but not after bad news, except during the nancial crisis. The asymmetry
in observed results can be explained by dierences in belief heterogeneity of investors
and market attention during news releases.
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1 Introduction
The discussion about how speculative trading aects asset price dynamics dates back at
least to Keynes (1936) and Hayek (1945). More recent theoretical models of Delong et al.
(1990), Cutler, Poterba, and Summers (1990), Hong and Stein (1999) and Stein (2009) also
challenge Friedman's (1953) famous statement that rational arbitrageurs make markets more
ecient. Specically, Stein (2009) emphasizes that the increased number of sophisticated
traders on current nancial markets, such as hedge funds, does not necessarily push prices
closer to fundamentals, even if one assumes that they are fully rational and have access to
an innite amount of capital.
Stein's (2009) model is based on two main assumptions. First, sophisticated traders do
not anchor their demand to a fundamental value of an asset. A real-world example is a
post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD) strategy, when they buy if post-announcement
returns are positive, and sell if returns are negative. Second, they do not know the exact
number of their competitors who are currently trading in the same direction.1 When news
comes out, it can only be observed by another group of investors, so-called newswatchers.
They are assumed to initially underreact to the news, which provides sophisticated traders
with a potentially protable trading opportunity. Even though sophisticated traders do not
observe the new fundamental value directly, they could infer it from prices, if they knew
the current amount of their competitors' capital.2 If the current amount of competitors'
capital is not known, they have to condition their demand on the expected number of their
competitors currently trading in the market. However, when this number turns out to be
larger than expected, excessively high demand causes prices to overreact - a situation Stein
(2009) describes as a crowded-trade eect.
1The second assumption is crucial and dierentiates Stein's (2009) model from previous work by Hong
and Stein (1999) and Abreu and Brunnermeier (2002, 2003).
2The price for an asset in the rst time period, P1, is a function of the fundamental F , underreaction
parameter δ and the total arbitrage capacity, n. So, if δ and n are known, sophisticated investors can infer
F from the price P1.
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In this paper, I empirically test Stein's (2009) crowded-trade theory in the periods
immediately after earnings announcement releases, using high trading aggressiveness as a
measure of crowded trading. In Stein (2009), when an unexpectedly large number of sophis-
ticated traders shows up, their high aggregate demand makes prices move more for a given
fundamental shock, i.e., observed returns are high. Therefore, their linear return-based
strategy buys a larger quantity of shares in these states. However, it is exactly in these
states when execution of larger trades is more dicult because of an already high aggregate
demand, and thus should make sophisticated investors trade more aggressively to obtain ex-
ecution of their order. Therefore, high trading aggressiveness after earnings releases should
reect periods when trading becomes crowded, with many competing investors submitting
their orders in the news direction. Overall, larger quantities traded taken together with a
higher than expected number of participants should result in subsequent price overreaction
and trading losses during these periods.
I measure trading aggressiveness as the proportion of volume executed through intermar-
ket sweep orders (ISOs), split across multiple exchanges. ISOs represent the most aggressive
order type available on the US market, because they are executed more quickly than stan-
dard market orders. Therefore, they directly reect investors' preferences to trade quickly,
even at an inferior price. Further, submission of ISOs requires simultaneous monitoring
of several market centers and their usage is essentially restricted to professional traders.3
My data sample consists of earnings announcements released within trading hours between
October 2007, when ISOs rst become available, and December 2017. Earnings announce-
ments are the natural choice for this study, because they represent the most common type
of information release for any stock.
The details of my research design and main ndings are as follows. First, I analyze
the usage of ISOs both during normal trading periods and on announcement days. My
3Section 2 provides a short overview of ISOs. For a detailed overview, please refer to Chakravarty et
al. (2012), who provide an excellent analysis of ISO characteristics and their usage on the current nancial
markets.
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ndings show that only around a third of ISO trades, which are executed across multiple
exchanges, can be regarded as truly aggressive. Further, the proportion of multi-exchange
ISO volume, traded in the news direction, signicantly increases for up to two hours following
an announcement release, suggesting their potential usage by sophisticated investors to trade
quickly on new information. Based on this evidence, I use the proportion of multi-exchange
ISOs, submitted in the news direction within the rst two hours following an announcement
release, as the benchmark measure of trading aggressiveness in my subsequent empirical
analyses.4
Next, I test the overreaction hypothesis, using Hong, Kubik, and Fishman's (2012) two-
step approach. In the rst step, I analyze the initial price reaction, measured as the buy-
and-hold return over days 0 and 1, BHAR(0;1). I conduct dierence-in-dierences tests,
both in a univariate and multivariate setup, using pre-announcement trading days as the
control group. My ndings show that high trading aggressiveness signicantly increases
initial abnormal returns by 1.4 percentage points (p.p.) after positive news and decreases
them by 1.0 p.p. after negative news, compared to stocks with low trading aggressiveness
on the announcement day. However, a larger initial price reaction is not sucient to test for
overreaction, because it could also be that high trading aggressiveness pushes the stock price
in the direction of fundamentals. For this reason, I next turn to sharper tests of long-run
post-announcement returns.
If high trading aggressiveness does lead to price overreaction on the announcement day,
then prices for these announcements should reverse in the long run. A long-term price
reversal is a strong test, because it goes against the PEAD, with good news usually being
followed by positive returns and bad news by negative returns (Bernard and Thomas 1989,
1990). Consistent with the price overreaction hypothesis, initial abnormal returns of 8.0 p.p.
for aggressively traded stocks after good news are oset by subsequent return reversals of
4I conduct several robustness checks with respect to the length of the time interval, but all main results
continue to hold.
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-8.6 p.p., resulting in an overall negative abnormal return of -1.3 p.p. Thus, my ndings for
good news strongly support the predictions of Stein's (2009) crowded trade theory.
Interestingly, I do not observe any overreaction after bad news. In contrast, long-run
returns for aggressively traded stocks are negative, consistent with PEAD: initial abnormal
returns of -7.5 p.p. are followed by the post-announcement drift of -3.8 p.p., resulting
in an overall abnormal return of -11.0 p.p. Importantly, the post-announcement drift for
aggressively traded stocks is lower in absolute terms, compared to the drift of -8.4 p.p. for
stocks with low trading aggressiveness on the announcement day. Overall, the ndings for
the sample of bad news suggest that high sell-side trading aggressiveness actually reduces the
PEAD drift, consistent with sophisticated aggressive traders pushing prices in the direction
of the fundamental value after the announcement release.
I further analyze whether the eect of trading aggressiveness on long-term returns is
dierent during the nancial crisis of 2007-2008. Price overreaction after positive releases is
observed both in crisis and non-crisis periods, but is more pronounced during crisis, which
can be explained by larger market uncertainty about the news in this period. However, after
bad news, the positive eect of high trading aggressiveness on the PEAD drift is only limited
to the crisis period.
Stein's (2009) predictions are symmetrical for positive and negative news, but price over-
reaction is empirically observed only in the sample of good news. I test two potential
explanations for the asymmetry in the observed ndings. The rst explanation, based on
theoretical predictions of Hong and Stein (1999) and Stein (2009), is related to dierences in
belief heterogeneity of unsophisticated investors. In both models, unsophisticated investors,
or newswatchers, are assumed to underreact to the news because of slow diusion of pri-
vate information: dierent investors observe dierent subsets of information, their beliefs
are more heterogeneous at the beginning and converge only gradually, as they observe more
and more information over time. Thus, more heterogeneous beliefs about news should slow
down information diusion, which leads to stronger initial underreaction. Since the total
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amount of prots is shared between newswatchers and sophisticated investors, stronger
initial underreaction by newswatchers implies potentially larger prots for sophisticated
traders. As a result, the latter trade more aggressively, and their stronger aggregate demand
leads to stronger price overreaction.
Empirically, the newswatchers' beliefs are likely to be more heterogeneous after positive
news, because a greater fraction of news is already incorporated in stock prices prior to the of-
cial release. Therefore, it is more dicult for newswatchers to agree on the interpretation
of the residual news. Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki (2009) provide empirical evidence that
managers leak positive information before the ocial announcement release, but withhold
negative news until the release. Further, margin trading is easier for opening long positions
with insucient capital than short selling with insucient stock holding. Therefore, short-
sale constraints also prevent negative information from being incorporated into prices before
a negative announcement release (Diamond and Verrecchia 1987). Consequently, after pos-
itive news, greater heterogeneity in investors' beliefs should increase overcrowding and lead
to stronger price overreaction. In contrast, after negative news, beliefs of unsophisticated
investors are likely to be more homogeneous, which reduces the probability of overcrowding.
I test this explanation, using dierent proxies of heterogeneity of investors' beliefs: stock re-
turn volatility, the VIX index, and large drops in the order imbalance on an announcement
day, capturing higher divergence in investors' opinions about news. My ndings show that
the overreaction for aggressively traded stocks after good news is indeed more pronounced
for announcements with greater investors' belief heterogeneity, whereas it does not seem to
play an important role after negative earnings releases.
The second explanation relates to the degree of market participants' attention after news
releases. DeHaan, Shevlin, and Thornock (2015) show that managers choose to strategically
report good news in periods of higher market attention and bad news in periods of lower
market attention. However, the eect of market attention on price eciency is largely de-
pendent on the composition of traders on an announcement day. If higher attention is driven
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by sophisticated investors with superior information processing skills, then it should facili-
tate incorporation of information into prices. However, if it is largely driven by uninformed
sophisticated investors that engage in positive feedback trading, then higher attention rather
facilitates overcrowding and price overreaction.
Following DeHaan, Shevlin, and Thornock (2015), I examine announcements released on
non-Fridays and those released on non-busy reporting days, which are supposed to attract
higher levels of market attention. Overall, my ndings suggest that aggressive trading on
days with high market attention stems from uninformed investors that engage in positive
feedback trading. After good news, aggressive purchases on days with higher attention lead
to stronger price overreaction. After bad news, aggressive sales on days with lower attention
lead to the reduction in the PEAD drift, improving price eciency. Thus, low market
attention after bad news appears to be largely driven by sophisticated traders with superior
information processing skills.
One potential concern might be that the increased use of ISOs after information releases
is related to decreasing liquidity supply, as discussed by Chakravarty et al. (2011). To
address this concern, I analyze the intraday determinants of ISO volume and show that, in
contrast to ISOs executed on a single exchange, the proportion of multi-exchange ISO trades
is not related to larger spreads on the announcement day. This nding excludes the previous
concern at least for the multi-exchange ISO category, which is used as a benchmark measure
of trading aggressiveness in overreaction tests. Overall, my ndings on the intraday use of
ISOs complement those of Chakravarty et al. (2011) and show that splitting ISO volume by
exchange category helps to distinguish aggressive orders that represent traders' reactions to
the news from those that are used because of drops in liquidity supply.
This paper contributes to the literature that investigates how speculative trading by
sophisticated investors aects asset price dynamics. To the best of my knowledge, the closest
papers to mine are Lou and Polk (2012), Sias, Turtle, and Zykaj (2016) and McInish, Upson,
and Wood (2014). The rst two papers also empirically test Stein's (2009) predictions. Lou
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and Polk (2012) propose a new measure of the total amount of arbitrage capital, invested in
momentum strategies. In particular, they measure excess correlations in abnormal returns
of typical momentum stocks, and dub this measure comomentum. They further show that
when comomentum is high, long-run returns to a momentum strategy are negative. Hence,
their paper provides empirical evidence for Stein's (2009) theory for a sample of momentum
stocks. Sias, Turtle, and Zykaj (2016) use overlap of stocks in hedge fund portfolios as a
measure of hedge fund crowding and, surprisingly, nd that the overlap of hedge fund equity
portfolios is remarkably low, inconsistent with hedge funds crowding into the same stocks. In
contrast to previous studies, my approach is independent of any assumption about trading
strategy. Further, high trading aggressiveness in post-announcement periods can be regarded
as a more direct measure of crowded trading, because it is based on actual trading data and
reects traders' preferences for quicker execution of their orders directly at the time of their
submission.
McInish, Upson, and Wood (2014) also analyze the role of ISO trading aggressiveness
in market eciency, but in a dierent setup. Specically, they document a substantially
higher use of ISOs during the Flash Crash on May 6, 2010, with over 65% of the sell volume
during the crash period and about 53% of the buy volume during the recovery period coming
from these aggressive orders. My ndings complement their earlier results and show that
the usage of ISOs can have destabilizing eects not only during crisis times, but also after
regular quarterly earnings announcements for a broad sample of rms.
Building upon the pioneering work of Chakravarty et al. (2012), my paper also sheds
light on the use and characteristics of intermarket sweep orders on the current nancial
markets. Like them, I nd that ISO trades have a signicantly larger information share
relative to non-ISO trades. In addition, I separately analyze ISOs, executed on a single
exchange, and those split across multiple exchanges, and show that multi-exchange ISOs are
increasingly used by professional traders to trade in the news direction immediately after
earnings releases.
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My paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional framework and pro-
vides details of the sample construction. Section 3 analyzes characteristics of aggressive
orders in the base period and around earnings announcements. Section 4 investigates eects
of trading aggressiveness on asset price dynamics, and Section 5 briey concludes.
2 Institutional Setting and Sample Construction
2.1 Overview of Intermarket Sweep Orders
On August 29, 2005, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted a new set
of rules, known as the Regulation National Market System (Reg NMS). The SEC designed
the new regulation to modernize US equity markets and to promote their eciency. Due
to technical diculties with the implementation of several changes required by this new
regulation, markets achieved full compliance with Reg NMS rst on October 8, 2007.5
The Order Protection Rule. The most important change introduced by Reg NMS is
the adoption of the Order Protection Rule (Rule 611), which implements partial protection
against trade-throughs on US markets. A trade-through occurs when the best available bid
or oer quotation is ignored, or in other words, traded-through. For example, assume there
are only two trading venues, A and B. Table I shows the bid sides of visible limit order books
in two venues. The rst column shows the currently quoted bid prices, while the second and
third columns indicate the number of shares available at each price for venues A and B,
respectively. Prior to Reg NMS, a market order sent to exchange A would just walk down
the limit order book of A until either the order was completely lled or the limit price of
the order was reached. For instance, an order of 4,000 shares would be split into 500 shares
executed at $10.75, an additional 2,000 shares at $10.70 and the remaining 1,500 shares at
$10.67. The best bid of $10.73 at B is then ignored, or traded-through.
5See Regulation NMS, SEC Release No. 34-51808.
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Table I. Bid Side of Limit Order Book





With the new Order Protection Rule, when a new market (or marketable limit) order
arrives, the trading venue has to check whether the order (or its portion) would cause a
trade-through of better quotes on other venues. Should other venues quote better prices,
the order (or its corresponding portion) is automatically re-routed for execution to other
venues.6 To comply with the Order Protection Rule, venue A now re-routes 500 shares for
execution at B before executing the remaining part of the order.7
The Order Protection Rule caters mainly to the interests of retail investors. The best-
price execution guarantee increases the retail investors' condence and decreases their search
costs for the best available price. Further, protection of best-priced bid and ask quotes on
each trading venue from potential trade-throughs encourages liquidity providers to post limit
orders at best prices. Although appealing to retail investors with a long-term investment
horizon, the Order Protection Rule is less attractive for short-term and institutional investors:
re-routing takes time and the best bid can change while the order is being re-routed. Thus,
the execution of large-sized orders under the Order Protection Rule takes longer and might
end up at an inferior average price, compared to having the whole order executed at a single
venue.
6However, the order protection is partial, because it is only limited to the top visible quotes in the book
of each venue, referred to as the Best Bid and Oer (BBO). In the previous example, only 500 shares at
$10.75 on A and 500 shares at $10.73 on B are protected quotes.
7Note that such execution would still result in a trade-through of 600 shares available at $10.70 on B,
but this quote is not considered protected and can therefore be ignored under the current rules.
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ISO as an exemption to the Order Protection Rule. To avoid such situations,
the Order Protection Rule makes an exemption for a specic order type, an intermarket
sweep order (ISO). An ISO is a marketable limit order (Immediate-Or-Cancel) that provides
an opportunity for institutional investors to trade large blocks quickly. Specically, when
an ISO arrives at a particular trading venue, it is executed as if this venue stands alone.
Importantly, there is no re-routing requirement, even if some parts of the order cause trade-
throughs of the protected quotes at other venues. However, to ensure compliance with the
principles of the Order Protection Rule, an investor who submits an ISO is responsible for
sending additional limit orders, also designated as ISOs, to other venues quoting the stock.
The size of these additional ISOs should be sucient to execute against the total number
of shares available at protected quotes superior to the ISO limit price.8 Therefore, an ISO
represents a series of marketable limit orders sent across all trading venues quoting stock at
the BBO that is superior to the ISO limit price.9
To illustrate, suppose that an institutional investor would like to use an ISO to sell 4,000
shares at the limit price of $10.67. To comply with the Order Protection Rule, the investor
has to send two limit orders, marked as ISO, of at least 500 shares each with the limit price of
$10.67 simultaneously to both venues. The investor has a choice about how to split the total
order: either send 3,500 shares to A and 500 shares to B or 2,900 to A and 1,100 to B. In the
latter case, the split is optimal, because the investor gets a better average execution price.
However, some investors might choose to send a larger portion of their order to A because
they believe that the speed of execution on A is faster. Since trading venues can recognize
both orders as ISOs, they do not re-route either of them. Both venues instantaneously
8Paragraph (b)(30) of Rule 600 gives a formal denition of an intermarket sweep order as a limit order
that satises the following requirements: (1) when routed to a trading venue, the limit order is identied
as an intermarket sweep order; and (2) simultaneously with the routing of the limit order identied as an
intermarket sweep order, one or more additional limit orders, as necessary, are routed to execute against the
full displayed size of all protected quotations with a superior price.
9Note that ISOs represent liquidity-demanding orders, because the unexecuted part of the order is can-
celed, without being displayed in the limit order book (Immediate-or-Cancel orders).
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execute ISOs against the outstanding orders and the new best price drops to $10.70 in the
case of the suboptimal ISO split and to $10.67 in the case of the optimal split.10
In the previous example, under the assumption that the limit order book does not change
between the time of order submission and its execution, a series of ISOs sent across exchanges
will always execute at the average price that is at least as good as that for a standard limit
order. So where is the tradeo between the speed of execution and execution at a better
price? In reality, the state of the book might change when the routing decision for ISO has
already been taken. Suppose a new bid quote at $10.75 for 1,000 shares appears on another
venue C at the time when both an ISO and a non-ISO are already on their way to A. The
ISO is executed exactly as before, whereas the additional 1,000 shares of the non-ISO are
re-routed to C. The average execution price of the non-ISO is better overall in this case.
However, this case is most likely to occur during a normal trading period when liquidity
supply is not scarce and there are no upcoming information releases about the stock. By
contrast, as liquidity supply drops around information releases and the fundamental value
of the stock is expected to change, there is a higher probability that a better priced quote
(in this case, 500 shares at $10.73) is withdrawn by the time the re-routed order reaches
exchange B. For example, after negative news, an immediate sell with an ISO will result in a
better overall average execution price, as compared to the execution price of non-ISO orders.
Therefore, in highly volatile markets, traders care more about the immediacy of execution
rather than execution at a potentially better price.
2.2 Sample Construction and Summary Statistics
The data source for earnings announcements is the Institutional Brokers' Estimate System
(I/B/E/S) database. I collect announcements that are made within the trading hours of US
10Prior to Reg NMS an ISO could be replicated as a series of smartly routed marketable orders. However,
the speed of execution was the same for all orders in the market. Even though technological advancements
might have increased the absolute speed of order execution post-Reg NMS, the Order Protection Rule slowed
down the execution of standard market (or marketable limit) orders relative to ISOs, thus generating a
relative dierence in the speed of execution between ISOs and non-ISOs.
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equity trading exchanges (9.30 - 16.00 EST) from October 2007, when intermarket sweep
orders become available, until December 2017.11 Each record has an exact date and time
stamp (accurate within a minute). Further, I require that each rm exists in the intersection
set of I/B/E/S and CRSP. Table 1 provides details of the sample construction.
[Insert Table 1 approximately here]
The initial sample consists of 10,140 announcements by 3,775 rms. I omit 631 an-
nouncements for which the stock is not traded on the announcement day, and another 1,587
announcements for which intraday transaction data are not available. I further lose 1,079
announcements by excluding stocks with a closing price of less than $2 two days prior to
the announcement date and days with multiple announcements by the same rm. Omitting
announcements with fewer than 40 days of previous trading data and those of active stocks
with more than 10 trades per minute leaves 6,229 announcements by 2,481 rms, or around
60% of the initial sample.12
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the nal sample of earnings announcements.
Data on daily stock prices, holding period returns, volume traded, and shares outstanding are
from CRSP. Using these data, I calculate market capitalization, MCap, average daily volume
traded, Volume, annualized daily return volatility, Volat, and buy-and-hold abnormal returns
(BHARs) around earnings announcement dates. BHARs are estimated with the market
model, using the equally-weighted CRSP index as the market portfolio. The estimation
period for the parameters is (-264, -64). I require the stock to have at least 100 observations in
the estimation period. Beta is the slope from the market model and represents the systematic
risk of the rm. Appendix A provides a detailed description of variable denitions.
11The focus of this study are announcements made within trading hours, because they allow for the analysis
of the immediate reaction of traders to the news. Even though the majority of earnings announcements take
place outside trading hours, the analysis of the immediate reaction is important to assess potential eects
of trading aggressiveness after unexpected information releases. The nal sample contains many well-known
rms, such as Google, Coca-Cola, Toyota, SAP, Allianz, Expedia, and many others.
12Previous trading data is required to construct the control sample and the average levels of ISO volume in
the pre-announcement period. Excluding the announcements of active stocks with more than 10 trades per
minute is necessary to mitigate the bias in classication of ISOs across single- and multi-exchange categories,
as discussed in the next section.
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[Insert Table 2 approximately here]
I extract additional variables from two dierent databases. First, quarterly accounting
data on the book value of equity (item ceqq) are obtained from Compustat. The market-
to-book ratio, MTB, is calculated as the ratio of market capitalization two days prior to
an announcement to the book value of equity at the end of the previous quarter. Second,
I extract the quoted spread, Qspr; the daily order imbalance, OIB; the total depth at the
national best bid and the best ask, Depth; and the realized variance over the ve seconds
before trade execution, RealV ar[−5s], from the NYSE TAQ database.Qspr over a given
time interval is calculated as the dierence between the National Best Ask and the National
Best Bid, scaled by their average. OIB is calculated as the absolute value of the dierence
between the purchase and sale volume on the announcement day, scaled by the total volume
traded. RealV ar[−5s] is calculated as the sum of the squared high-frequency NBBO quote
midpoint returns over ve seconds before the transaction. Appendix B provides further
information on TAQ data ltering. The statistics for all variables are generally comparable
to those reported in previous studies analyzing long-term post-announcement returns, e.g.
by Hong, Kubik, and Fishman (2012) and Hung, Li, and Wang (2014).
3 Trading with Aggressive Orders
3.1 Trading with Aggressive Orders in the Base Period
First, I examine the usage of intermarket sweep orders during normal trading periods. I
extract the tick-by-tick data on the trading volume separately for ISOs and standard market
orders (non-ISOs) from the NYSE Trade and Quote database (TAQ) from October 2007,
with the introduction of ISOs to the market, until the end of my sample in December 2017.
ISOs are marked with the code F in the condition eld of the TAQ. The TAQ database
does not record the size of an original ISO order, only the sizes of individual ISO transactions
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executed on a particular exchange. However, individual ISOs are often reported as a series
of transactions that are executed in the same second. To reconstruct the size of an original
ISO order, I thus aggregate all individual ISOs that occur in the same second and in the
same direction and refer to aggregated ISOs as ISO trades in the remaining part of the
paper.
The mean proportion of ISO volume in my sample is 34.78%, which shows that aggressive
orders are widely used.13 However, not all ISO trades appear to be truly aggressive, because
very often they are executed on a single exchange. This is puzzling since the original purpose
of ISO is to allow quick trading of large blocks across multiple exchanges. To investigate
the issue further, I split ISO trades into four exchange-price categories: trades executed on
1) a single exchange at the same price (SameEx-SamePrc); 2) a single exchange at multiple
prices (SameEx-MultiPrc); 3) multiple exchanges at the same price (MultiEx-SamePrc),
and 4) multiple exchanges at multiple prices (MultiEx-MultiPrc). The exchange category
is arguably more important than the price category, because the choice to submit an order
to dierent exchanges is made by the trader, whereas execution at multiple prices can be
endogenous and reect execution against hidden orders. Therefore, I mainly concentrate on
split by exchange category in the remainder of the paper.
Panel A of Table 3 reports cross-sectional averages of the proportion of ISO volume by
four exchange-price categories in the pre-announcement period (days -40 to -2). The daily
proportion of ISO volume within a given category is calculated as the ratio of the daily ISO
volume traded within the category to the overall volume traded during the day.
[Insert Table 3 approximately here]
Surprisingly, around 66% of all ISO trades are executed on the same exchange (22.98% of
34.78%), and out of them, the vast majority are also executed at the same price. By contrast,
only around 34% of ISOs (11.80% of 34.78%) are executed across multiple exchanges, which
13Chakravarty et al. (2012) also nd that the use of ISO orders is non-trivial and amounts to 41% of
trading volume in their sample.
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implies that only a third of ISO trades seem to be used according to their original purpose
and can be classied as truly aggressive.14
It could still be that single-exchange ISO trades are also used to execute large blocks, if
their size is on average larger than that of comparable non-ISO trades. For this reason, I
compare sizes of ISO and non-ISO trades across two exchange categories. For comparison
purposes, I also aggregate all non-ISOs that occur in the same second and in the same
direction, and split all non-ISO trades into single-exchange and multi-exchange trades. Panel
B of Table 3 presents the comparison results, separately for purchases (SizeBuy) and sales
(SizeSell). The rst two columns report dierences between ISO and non-ISO trades,
executed on a single exchange. The third and fourth columns report dierences between
trades, executed on multiple exchanges, whereas the last column reports dierences between
ISO trades across two exchange categories. Importantly, the trade size of ISOs, executed on
a single exchange, is signicantly lower than that of comparable non-ISO trades: 208 versus
275 shares for purchases, and 221 versus 315 shares for sales. Sizes of multi-exchange ISO
trades are signicantly larger than those of their single-exchange counterparts by 418 for
purchases and 435 for sales. However, they are still signicantly lower than the sizes of the
multi-exchange non-ISO trades.
To analyze informativeness of single- and multi-exchange ISOs, I further compare their
price impacts to price impacts of comparable non-ISO trades. The price impact of each trade
after s seconds is dened as PrcImpt,s = 2 |Qt+s −Qt| /Qt · 100%, where Qt is the midpoint
price calculated as the average of the prevailing bid and ask quotes, Qt = (At + Bt)/2, and
Qt+s represents the midpoint price after s seconds. The last two rows in Panel B of Table
14Aggregating ISO trades over each second can potentially lead to the overstatement of the multi-exchange
ISO volume, if a series of single-exchange ISO trades are erroneously missclassied as one multi-exchange
ISO trade. To mitigate the bias, I exclude trades of active stocks with more than 10 trades per minute.
Even though the eect of this bias cannot be ruled out completely, classifying too many ISO transactions as
multi-exchange ISO trades introduces more noise, and, if anything, should lead to underestimation of main
eects in my paper. All main results continue to hold if I exclude trades of active stocks with more than 5
trades per minute (see robustness checks in Section 4.2).
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3 present the initial one-second and the long-run one-minute (or 60-second) price impacts,
with purchases and sales shown separately.
Regardless of the time horizon and exchange category, the price impact of ISO trades
is signicantly larger than that of corresponding non-ISO trades This nding is consistent
with prior ndings by Chakravarty et al. (2012), who also document a larger information
share of ISO trades. It further suggests that ISOs might be used not only by institutional
investors to escape complicated order re-routing, but also by more sophisticated investors,
such as high-frequency traders (HFT), to trade quickly on the new information before it is
incorporated in prices through trades of their competitors.15
Importantly, multi-exchange ISO trades appear to convey more information, because
they have a signicantly higher price impact than their single-exchange counterparts. Their
higher initial one-second price impact can be partially attributed to their overall larger
trade size. However, if all of it were mechanically related to the trade size, then it would
dissipate shortly, after the order book is replenished with new limit orders. By contrast, the
price impact of multi-exchange ISOs continues to stay signicantly dierent from that of
single-exchange ISOs even after one minute. Further, their one-minute price impact is also
signicantly higher than that of non-ISO trades with comparable trade sizes. Interestingly,
whereas the price impact of multi-exchange ISO sales drops from 0.14% to 0.11% within one
minute, the price impact of ISO purchases increases from 0.13% to 0.16%, signaling their
relatively higher informativeness.
Overall, my ndings in this section show that only around a third of ISO trades, which are
executed across multiple exchanges, can be regarded as truly aggressive. The multi-exchange
ISO trades have the highest one-minute price impacts, suggesting their potential usage by
sophisticated investors to trade quickly on new information.
15Anecdotal evidence from practitioners suggests that HFTs do indeed use ISOs to gain rst position in
the execution queue. Chapter 3 of Bodek (2013) discusses the use of ISOs by high-frequency traders in more
detail.
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3.2 Trading with Aggressive Orders around Earnings Announce-
ments
Next, I analyze trading with ISOs around earnings announcements. If sophisticated
investors would like to trade quickly on the new information, I expect them to increase their
trading aggressiveness in post-announcement periods. Panel A of Table 4 shows changes
in the proportion of ISO volume (4ISOV ol) on the announcement day by four exchange-
price categories. The change for each category is calculated as the dierence between the
proportion of ISO volume traded within the category on the announcement day and its mean
in the base period.
[Insert Table 4 approximately here]
The results show that the total proportion of ISO volume increases signicantly by 1.19%,
which is consistent with earlier ndings of Chakravarty et al. (2011).16 Importantly, addi-
tional split by exchange categories shows that this increase in trading aggressiveness is almost
exclusively driven by an increase in the proportion of truly aggressive multi-exchange ISO
trades (1.22%), whereas the proportion of single-exchange trades practically does not change
(-0.03%).
A total increase in the daily proportion of ISO volume of around 1% might not seem very
signicant economically. For this reason, I further examine changes in the proportion of ISO
volume at the intraday level in Figure 1. The dierences from the pre-announcement means
are measured in 10-minute intervals relative to the 10-minute interval from an earnings
announcement release (interval 0). Solid lines show changes in the proportions of single-
exchange ISO trades and dashed lines those of multi-exchange ISO trades.
[Insert Figure 1 approximately here]
The intraday analysis shows a jump of around 4% in the proportion of multi-exchange ISO
trades in the 10 minutes following the release, which is both economically and statistically
16McInish, Upson, and Wood (2014) also document a substantially higher use of ISOs during the Flash
Crash on May 6, 2010, with 53% of the buy volume during the recovery period coming from these aggressive
orders.
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signicant. It subsequently decreases, but remains signicantly higher than in the pre-
announcement period for around two hours after the release. In contrast, the proportion
of single-exchange ISO trades drops by around 2% subsequent to an information release.
Overall, these ndings suggest that sophisticated investors increase their usage of multi-
exchange ISOs immediately following an announcement release to quickly trade on new
information.
To further test this prediction, I analyze the trade direction of multi-exchange ISOs
on announcement days. If multi-exchange ISOs are indeed used by sophisticated traders,
then I expect their proportion to increase more in the news direction. I split all earnings
announcements into terciles of BHAR(0;1) and dene the top 33% as good news, the bottom
33% as bad news, and the remainder as announcements with largely no news. Panel B
of Table 4 shows that the proportion of multi-exchange ISO volume (4ISOV olMultiEx)
increases more for announcements with greater news content: 1.90% for good news and
1.85% for bad news, as compared to 0.96% for no news. Importantly, the increase of ISO
volume is larger in the direction of the news: the proportion of multi-exchange ISO buy
volume increases by 2.71% after good news and that of ISO sell volume by 2.40% after bad
news, which further conrms the increased usage of multi-exchange ISOs by sophisticated
investors in post-announcement periods.17
3.3 Trading Aggressiveness as a Measure of Crowding
Two main underlying assumptions of Stein (2009) are that sophisticated traders do not
anchor their strategies to the fundamental value and that they face uncertainty concerning
the total number of their competitors taking the same position in the stock. Under these
assumptions, their demand for an asset is linearly increasing in asset returns, causing them
to behave as momentum traders. For example, they might engage in trading on the post-
17Even though the proportions against the news direction also increase, those in the news direction dom-
inate: the dierence between increases in ISO buy volume and ISO sell volume (4Buy −4Sell) is positive
(negative) and statistically signicant for good (bad) news, and practically zero for announcements with no
news.
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earnings announcement drift (PEAD), buying after positive returns and selling after negative
returns.
Stein (2009) models aggregate risk tolerance of sophisticated traders as n = Nθ, where
N represents the expected number of traders at a given point in time, and θ is a random
variable with a mean of 1, distributed on the interval [θL, θH ], with θL ≥ 0. Thus, states with
a low realization of θ correspond to a low number of sophisticated investors trading after the
news. In these states, their aggregate demand is low, resulting in lower observed returns.
Note that a trader following a linear return-based strategy will buy a lower quantity of shares
when observed returns are low. Therefore, lower quantities demanded by every individual
trader combined with a low overall number of sophisticated traders in the market lead to
underreaction of prices to fundamentals and, consequently, small trading gains in low-θ
states.
However, for the zero-prot condition to hold, the low-θ states that occur more frequently
need to be balanced out by less frequent high-θ states, when an unexpectedly large number
of sophisticated traders shows up. In a high-θ state, with a higher than expected demand,
prices move more for a given fundamental shock, i.e., observed returns are high. Importantly,
traders cannot dierentiate whether these higher returns are due to a large fundamental news
or due to trading by their competitors. Therefore, their linear momentum strategies buy a
larger quantity of shares, which, taken together with a high overall number of sophisticated
traders, causes price overreaction and subsequent trading losses - a situation described by
Stein (2009) as a crowded-trade eect.
To test Stein's (2009) predictions empirically, I use high trading aggressiveness, measured
as the proportion of multi-exchange ISO volume in post-announcement periods, as a signal
of crowded trading. Aggressive trading in post-announcement periods should correspond
to high-θ states in Stein's (2009) model: upon observing a larger return, a trader would like
to buy a larger quantity of shares, which is even harder when aggregate demand is already
very high, and thus makes him trade more aggressively in order to achieve the execution of
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his trade. Even though a trader cannot directly observe the exact number of his competitors,
their large aggregate demand makes execution of large orders more dicult. Indeed, quick
execution of large orders immediately after the news release might only be possible with
aggressive multi-exchange ISO orders.
Based on results from Figure 1, I use the proportion of multi-exchange ISO volume traded
in the news direction within two hours following an announcement release (%ISOV olMultiEx)
as the benchmark measure of trading aggressiveness.18 My ndings so far provide supporting
evidence that trading aggressiveness can indeed be regarded as a measure of crowded-trade:
the proportion of aggressive multi-exchange ISOs substantially increases in the period imme-
diately following earnings announcement releases, especially for announcements with large
absolute returns (see Table 4). Also, they are submitted predominantly in the news direction.
To provide further evidence that multi-exchange ISOs are increasingly used during periods
of large aggregate demand, I investigate the intraday determinants of ISO trading volume in
Table 5. The analysis is conducted separately for same-exchange and multi-exchange ISOs.
Specically, I estimate the following panel data OLS regressions with the proportion of ISO
volume (%ISOV ol) split by exchange category as the dependent variable:
%ISOV oli,t = α + β1V olumei,t−1 + β2RealV ar[−5s]i,t + β3OIBi,t−1 +
+ β4QSpri,t + β5Depthi,t +DaytimeFE +DayFE + εt.
One observation represents a 10-minute trading interval for a stock. Models (1) and (3)
analyze the base period, which consists of 39 trading days before an announcement day,
from day -40 to day -2. Models (2) and (4) analyze trading with ISOs on announcement
days. The vector of explanatory variables consists of V olume, the total volume traded over
the previous 10-minute interval; RealV ar [−5s], the average realized variance in the ve
seconds prior to ISO execution, averaged for all ISO trades within the 10-minute interval;
18I check that my results are robust with respect to the length of the post-announcement time interval
(see Section 4.2).
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OIB, order imbalance within the previous 10-minute interval; QSpr, the average prevailing
NBBO relative spread at the time of ISO execution, calculated as QSprt = (At − Bt)/Qt
and averaged for all ISO trades within the 10-minute interval; and Depth, the average sum of
shares available at the best NBBO bid and the best NBBO ask at the time of execution.19 All
regressions include day-xed eects and intraday dummies for each half-hour of the trading
day, with standard errors double-clustered at the rm and day level.
[Insert Table 5 approximately here]
If sophisticated investors choose to trade more aggressively during periods of large ag-
gregate demand, I expect the proportion of multi-exchange ISOs to increase with higher
aggregate volume traded in the previous 10-minute interval. Indeed, the usage of multi-
exchange ISOs increases signicantly with the higher aggregate volume traded, both in the
base period (Model 1) and on announcement dates (Model 2). By contrast, the proportion
of single-exchange ISO volume signicantly drops (Models 3 and 4), suggesting that traders
prefer to submit multi-exchange ISOs in the periods of large aggregate demand. Further,
the proportion of multi-exchange ISOs signicantly increases after stronger price movements
over the previous ve seconds, as depicted by the coecient on the realized variance. This
nding further conrms that investors choose to trade more aggressively when they observe
larger returns. Lower order imbalance in the previous period, which represents higher dis-
agreement between traders, also predicts a signicantly higher usage of multi-exchange ISOs
within the next time interval. However, it is not signicantly related to the proportion of
single-exchange ISO orders.
I additionally control for liquidity of the stock, measured by the relative spread and the
aggregate depth at NBBO, to account for another possible explanation of an increased usage
of ISOs around earnings announcements. Prior ndings by Chakravarty et al. (2011) suggest
19The realized variance, RealV ar [−5s], is calculated as the sum of the squared high-frequency NBBO
midpoint returns over the ve seconds before the transaction (RealV ar [−5s] =
−5∑
t=−1
(log Qt − log Qt−1)2)
and averaged for all ISO trades within each 10-minute interval.
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that investors might trade more aggressively as a result of a decreased liquidity supply. In
line with their ndings, Models (3) and (4) show that the proportion of single-exchange ISO
volume increases signicantly with larger spreads and lower depth, suggesting that traders
do indeed become more aggressive as liquidity supply drops. Importantly, the proportion of
multi-exchange ISOs only increases with higher spreads and lower depth in the base period
(Model 1) but no longer depends on either spreads or depth on announcement dates (Model
2). These results suggest that liquidity supply plays a smaller role for multi-exchange ISOs
and their increased usage in post-announcement periods can be rather attributed to sophis-
ticated investors trading quickly in the news direction. Overall, my ndings complement the
earlier results of Chakravarty et al. (2011) and show that splitting ISO volume by exchange
category helps to distinguish aggressive orders that represent traders' reactions to the news
from those that are used as a result of drops in liquidity supply.
4 Trading Aggressiveness and Price Dynamics
In this section, I empirically test Stein's (2009) prediction that crowded trading - the
situation of an unexpectedly large number of investors trading in the same direction - causes
price overreaction, using high trading aggressiveness in post-announcement periods as a
measure of crowding. Similar to Hong, Kubik, and Fishman (2012), I conduct testing for
overreaction in two steps. In the rst step, I analyze the initial price reaction: if high trading
aggressiveness represents competitive trading by sophisticated investors in the news direc-
tion, I expect it to be associated with the higher initial reaction of prices in the direction
of fundamentals. This higher initial reaction should occur irrespectively of whether prices
subsequently overreact or not. In the second step, I directly test for potential price over-
reaction by examining long-run post-announcement returns: if high trading aggressiveness
leads to price overreaction, I expect post-announcement returns to reverse in the long run.
By contrast, if investors could infer the exact number of their competitors, e.g., as in Holden
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and Subrahmanyam (1992), high trading aggressiveness should bring prices more quickly
towards fundamental values without causing any price overreaction.
4.1 Univariate Analysis
I start by testing the relation between trading aggressiveness and the initial price reaction,
measured as the two-day buy-and-hold abnormal return over days 0 and 1, BHAR(0;1).20
Since high trading aggressiveness should cause prices to react stronger initially, I expect
larger abnormal returns in the direction of the news for the announcements followed by
more aggressive trading.
I rst test this prediction in a univariate setup, dening announcements in the top tercile
of BHAR(0;1) as good news and in its bottom tercile as bad news. Within each news
category, I match stocks with high trading aggressiveness (HighTA stocks) and low trading
aggressiveness (LowTA stocks) both for announcement (Event) and non-announcement
(Non − Event) days, using nearest neighbor propensity score matching. Specically, for
the good news sample, HighTA stocks are dened as stocks, for which the proportion of
multi-exchange ISO purchase volume within the rst two hours of the announcement release
is in the top 50% of its distribution.21 The denition for the bad news sample is similar, but
is based on the proportion of multi-exchange ISO sale volume. The matching factors include
rm's market capitalization, MCap, stock's volatility, Volat, and its average daily trading
volume, Volume. The pre-announcement trading days -20, -30 and -40 are used as a control
group (Non − Event).22 The classication of HighTA and LowTA stocks for the control
group is based on the same two-hour time interval as for the corresponding announcement
day. Table 6 presents the results of the propensity score matching analysis.
20All results continue to hold if I use BHAR(-1;1) to measure the initial price reaction (untabulated).
21I conduct robustness checks on the length of the time interval, used for the denition of high trading
aggressiveness, in section 4.2.
22I use three equally-spread pre-announcement days as the control group to mitigate the eect of over-
lapping BHARs over longer time periods. Results are also robust if the control group consists of only one
pre-announcement day (see Section 4.2).
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[Insert Table 6 approximately here]
The upper panel reports the cross-sectional averages ofBHAR(0; 1), separately forHighTA
and Low TA stocks. Consistent with prior expectations, stocks with higher trading aggres-
siveness on the announcement day in the Event group experience signicantly stronger
initial price reaction in the news direction. The rst column shows results for the good
news sample. Aggressive buying with multi-exchange ISOs within two hours of a positive
earnings release signicantly increases BHAR(0; 1) by 1.71 percentage points (p.p.). This
represents a 28% increase relative to the average abnormal return of 6.19 p.p. for a stock
with low aggressiveness in the good news sample. The dierence of 1.71 p.p. is statistically
signicant at the 1% level, as suggested by the results of the t-test in the last row of the
panel. The second column reports a lower corresponding dierence of -0.21 p.p. for the
Non − Event control group. The third column (Diff) reports the dierences between the
Event and Non− Event groups. Importantly, the dierence-in-dierences equals 1.92 p.p.
(= 1.71 p.p. + 0.21 p.p.) and is statistically signicant at the 1% level. Similar results
are observed for the bad news sample in the last three columns: BHAR(0; 1) is lower by
1.07 p.p. for HighTA stocks on the event day relative to the control group and and the
dierence-in-dierences is statistically signicant at the 1% level.
The second step is testing for potential price overreaction by examining long-run post-
announcement returns. If the price overreaction hypothesis holds, I expect returns to reverse
in the long term for more aggressively traded stocks. The middle and the lower panel of
Table 6 provide supporting evidence for this hypothesis in the sample of good news. Indeed,
the middle panel shows that the long-term returns start to reverse for HighTA stocks
already after three months: BHAR(2; 64) after good news is negative and equals -2.74 p.p.
The dierence-in-dierences constitutes -4.84 p.p., and is both economically and statistically
signicant. The reversal continues and is more pronounced after six months, as documented
by the negative BHAR(2; 128) of -9.61 p.p. for HighTA stocks and the negative dierence-
in-dierences of -7.41 p.p. in the lower panel. Thus, consistent with Stein (2009), aggressive
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trading after positive news leads to signicant price overreaction, with around a third of
initial return dissipating over the rst three months and even turning negative after six
months.23
Interestingly, the long-term return reversal is not present in the sample of bad news. In
contrast, consistent with PEAD, initial negative returns are followed by long-term negative
returns for HighTA stocks: BHAR(2; 64) and BHAR(2; 128) constitute -4.57 p.p. and
-11.53 p.p., correspondingly. However, the long-term returns for HighTA stocks are sig-
nicantly higher than those for Low TA stocks: the dierences between the two groups of
stocks equal 2.09 p.p. and 3.24 p.p. for BHAR(2; 64) and BHAR(2; 128), respectively. The
corresponding dierence-in-dierences are also positive and statistically signicant. Higher,
but still negative, long-term returns imply the reduction in the PEAD drift for HighTA
stocks. Indeed, the ratio of BHAR(0; 1) to BHAR(0; 128) is around 42% for HighTA
stocks, compared to 33% for Low TA stocks, consistent with a larger amount of information
being priced in during the announcement window.24 Overall, ndings for the sample of bad
news suggest that sophisticated investors are able to better process its content, with aggres-
sive multi-exchange sell ISOs pushing prices closer to the new fundamental value after the
announcement release.
Stein's (2009) predictions are symmetrical irrespective of the news direction, but price
overreaction is only observed in the sample of good news. In section 4.3, I test two potential
explanations for the asymmetry in the observed ndings, related to heterogeneity in unso-
phisticated investors beliefs' and to the degree of market attention after the announcement
release.
23The total initial reaction of 7.90 p.p. for HighTA stocks and the subsequent drop of -9.61 p.p. imply
overall negative abnormal returns of (1 + 0.0790) ∗ (1− 0.0961)− 1 = −0.0247 or -2.47%.
24For HighTA stocks, BHAR(0;1)BHAR(0;128) =
−0.0778
(1−0.0778)(1−0.1153)−1 = 0.4228 or 42.28%. For Low TA stocks, this
ratio equals −0.0667−0.2045 = 0.3262 or 32.62%.
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4.2 Multivariate Analysis
I next check whether the previous ndings hold in a multivariate setup, again using pre-
announcement trading days -20, -30 and -40 as the control group. Specically, I estimate
the following regression, separately for positive and negative news:
BHAR(0; 1)i,t = α + β1Event+ β2HighTABuy/Selli,t + β3Event ·HighTABuy/Selli,t
+ β4LnMCapi,t + β5MTBi,t + β6Betai,t + β7BHAR(−23;−2)i,t
+ β8V olati,t + β9QSprSPY + β10OIBSPY +WeekdayFE
+ Month− Y earFE + εt.
The dependent variable is BHAR(0;1). The rst right-hand side variable, Event, equals
1 for earnings announcement days, and zero for non-announcement days that represent the
control group. HighTABuy (HighTASell) for good (bad) news is a dummy variable that
equals 1 for HighTA stocks, following the same classication procedure as in the univari-
ate analysis, and is zero otherwise. The main variable of interest is the interaction term
between Event and HighTABuy (HighTASell) that captures the dierential sensitivity of
HighTA stocks after earnings releases, relative to Low TA stocks. The vector of stan-
dardized control variables includes rm size, measured as the log of market capitalization
two days before the announcement, LnMcap; the market-to-book ratio, MTB; the market
model beta, Beta; one-month buy-and-hold abnormal returns before earnings announce-
ments, BHAR(−23;−2), and past volatility of daily returns, V olat. These control variables
are standard in regressions explaining abnormal returns around earnings announcements.25 I
additionally control for market liquidity and market-wide order imbalances, because market-
wide buying and selling pressure can potentially inuence individual stock imbalances and
returns. Specically, I calculate daily market quoted spread, QsprSPY , as the average of rel-
25See, for example, a recent study on post-earnings announcement drift by Hung, Li, and Wang (2014).
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ative quoted spread (QSpr) for SPDR S&P 500 ETF (ticker SPY) for each day. I calculate
the daily market order imbalance, OIBSPY , in a similar way, based on the order imbalance
for SPDR S&P 500 ETF.26 All regressions include weekday- and monthyear-xed eects and
allow standard errors to cluster at the rm and day level.27
[Insert Table 7 approximately here]
Model (1) of Panel A in Table 7 reports results for good news. β1 implies that Low TA
stocks display a 6.6 p.p. higher BHAR(0; 1) after positive news releases relative to the
benchmark group in the pre-announcement period. β2 captures the relative dierence in
BHAR(0; 1) between HighTA and Low TA stocks in the pre-announcement period, which
turns out to be insignicant. Importantly, β3 implies that HighTA stocks display a signif-
icantly higher BHAR(0; 1) of 1.4 p.p., compared to Low TA stocks after the news release.
Thus, the overall eect of having high buy-side trading aggressiveness after a positive an-
nouncement release can be computed as the sum of 6.6 p.p. and 1.4 p.p., or 8.0 p.p. Model
(2) reports similar results after negative news: β3 implies that high sell-side trading aggres-
siveness after a negative announcement release signicantly decreases BHAR(0; 1) by 1 p.p.,
with the overall eect of -7.5 p.p. The economic signicance of β3 for both news directions
is overall comparable to dierence-in-dierences from univariate results.
Currently, Models (1) and (2) suer from a potential endogeneity problem. Ideally, I
would like to control the abnormal return for true earnings surprise. Indeed, it could be the
case that prices react more strongly to announcements with higher earnings surprises and
traders choose to submit more aggressive orders in response to a higher earnings surprise.
The most common proxy for the earnings surprise, used in the literature, is based on the
dierence between actual earnings and the median analyst forecast from I/B/E/S. However,
only around 65% of rms in my sample are followed by analysts. Further, the I/B/E/S
26Table IA1 of the Internet Appendix reports the results for alternative controls of market factors, calcu-
lated as the value-weighted averages across all stocks in the TAQ universe. All results remain practically
unchanged.
27I do not include rm-xed eects since the median rm in my sample has only two announcements
released within trading hours during the sample period.
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surprise is based on forecasts of a handful of analysts and might itself be biased. I check
my results for robustness with the news direction based on the I/B/E/S earnings surprise in
Panel B of Table 7.
With no proper way to control for the true earnings surprise, the previous results for
BHAR(0; 1) in Panel A only show the signicant correlation between higher trading ag-
gressiveness and larger initial price reaction. For this reason, I now turn to sharper tests of
long-run post-announcement returns that no longer suer from the omitted variable com-
plications. Models (3) and (4) are similar to the previous specication, except that the
dependent variable now is BHAR(2; 128).28 Consistent with univariate results, β3 in Model
(3) is negative, suggesting that high buy-side trading aggressiveness after positive news leads
to signicantly lower subsequent returns of 7.1 p.p., compared to Low TA stocks. As before,
BHAR(0; 128) for HighTA stocks is actually negative and constitutes -1.3 p.p., consistent
with the predictions of Stein's (2009) price overreaction hypothesis.29 β3 for negative news
in Model (4) is positive and signicant at the 10% level, suggesting that stocks with high
sell-side trading aggressiveness display higher abnormal returns of 4.6 p.p. in the long-run.
However, given the constant of -0.128, BHAR(2; 128) remains overall negative and equals
-0.128 + 0.044 + 0.046 = -0.038 or -3.8 p.p. Consistent with the univariate results, this
result suggests that high sell-side trading aggressiveness after negative news actually reduces
the PEAD drift.
Panel B of Table 7 reports similar results, with the news classication based on the
I/B/E/S earnings surprise. I calculate it as the dierence between actual earnings and the
median analyst forecast from I/B/E/S, scaled by the price two days prior to the earnings
announcement. As expected, using the I/B/E/S earnings surprise reduces the number of
observations by around 50%, such that statistical signicance is overall weaker. BHAR(0; 1)
28Results for BHAR(2; 64), presented in the robustness section, also hold, but they are less signicant
economically and statistically. Results with shorter post-announcement event windows are not signicant,
which suggests that it takes the market at least three months to realize that the price has overreacted.
29The total initial reaction of 8.0 p.p. and the subsequent drop of -1.5 - 7.1 = -8.6 p.p. implies overall
negative abnormal returns of (1 + 0.08) ∗ (1− 0.086)− 1 = −0.013 or -1.3 p.p.
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for HighTA stocks is still signicantly higher by 1 p.p. after good news and lower by 1.4
p.p. after bad news. BHAR(2; 128) is signicantly lower by 7.1 p.p. for stocks with high
buy-side trading aggressiveness after good news. After bad news, β3 is still positive and
of comparable value of 4.6 p.p. to the previous results from Panel A, but is no longer
statistically signicant.
Since the direction of the I/B/E/S surprise and the direction of BHAR(0; 1) do not
always match up, I also report results separately for the samples of matching (Models 1 and
2) and conicting (Models 3 and 4) earnings signals in Table IA2 of Internet Appendix. The
proportion of conicts in direction of initial returns versus I/B/E/S surprise is around one-
third of the number of observations with available I/B/E/S surprise. Importantly, the price
overreaction after good news is observed only in the sample where both directions match
up. Therefore, it is advisable for future studies to look at both initial returns and I/B/E/S
surprise when classifying changes in the fundamental value of a stock.
Subsample splits. To analyze whether the eect of trading aggressiveness on long-
run post-announcement returns is dierent during crises times, I split the sample into two
periods: the nancial crisis period of 2007-2008 and the non-crisis period, covering years
2009-2017. I repeat the analysis from Table 7 for BHAR(2; 128), separately for the two
periods.30 Models (1) and (2) of Table 8 present the results for the crisis period, whereas
Models (3) and (4) report ndings for the non-crisis period.
[Insert Table 8 approximately here]
Interestingly, the price overreaction after good news is more pronounced during the 2007-
2008 nancial crisis when the market uncertainty about the news is larger. However, β3 is
also negative and signicant outside the crisis period. After bad news, β3 is positive in both
periods, but is only signicant at the 10% level during the crisis period. Therefore, the
eect of high sell-side trading aggressiveness on the PEAD drift is only limited to 2007-2008,
30For brevity, I do not report results for BHAR(0; 1). HighTABuy/Sell is statistically signicant at the
1% level for both types of news and in both periods, with eects being more pronounced in the crisis period.
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suggesting that negative information gets quicker impounded into prices with aggressive
orders during the crisis period.
Robustness checks. Panel A of Table 9 presents robustness checks of the main results
for good news and Panel B for bad news. Model (1) follows the previous specication with
BHAR(2; 64) as the dependent variable. As before, β3 is statistically signicant and negative
after good news, but its economic signicance is lower. Consistent with univariate results,
the strongest eects of price overreaction in the sample of good news are only observed after
six months. β3 is no longer signicant in the bad news sample, suggesting that there is no
signicant dierence in the PEAD drifts between Low TA and HighTA stocks within the
rst three months after the announcement release.
[Insert Table 9 approximately here]
Models (2) and (3) report results for BHAR(2; 128), using alternative denitions of
HighTABuy/Sell that are based on the dierent time intervals on an announcement day: in
the rst hour of the announcement release for Model (2) and in the period following the
rst two hours after the announcement release until the end of the trading day in Model (3).
The coecient for Event · HighTABuy continues to be negative for both periods, but its
economical magnitude and statistical signicance are smaller in Model (3). The coecient
for Event · HighTASell in Panel B is only signicant in Model (2). Overall, these results
suggest that the strongest eects can be attributed to the aggressive orders, submitted within
the rst two hours of an announcement release - used as a benchmark measure of trading
aggressiveness in this study.
Model (4) shows results for BHAR(2; 128), excluding active stocks that have more than
5 trades per minute, and Model (5) the corresponding results, using only trading day -40
as the control group. Whereas the overall number of observations is lower in these models,
both economic magnitude and statistical signicance remain the same for β3 after good
news. After bad news, β3 has even higher economic magnitudes compared to the benchmark
specication in Model (4) of Table 7.
30
4.3 Heterogeneous Beliefs, Market Attention and
Price Overreaction
In this section, I test two potential explanations for asymmetry in the observed results
between positive and negative earnings releases. The rst explanation, based on theoretical
predictions of Hong and Stein (1999) and Stein (2009), is related to a greater heterogeneity
in unsophisticated investors beliefs' after good news. The second explanation is based on
the previous ndings of DeHaan, Shevlin, and Thornock (2015) and relates to the degree of
market participants' attention after positive and negative news releases.
In Hong and Stein (1999) and Stein (2009), unsophisticated investors, or newswatchers,
are assumed to underreact to the news because of slow diusion of private information:
individual agents can initially process just a subset of all available information and use it
to form their current beliefs about the value of the stock. Since dierent investors observe
dierent subsets of information, their beliefs are more heterogeneous at the beginning and
converge only gradually, as they observe more and more information over time. Thus, more
heterogeneous beliefs about news should signal slower information diusion, and lead to
stronger initial underreaction. In both models, the total amount of prots is shared between
newswatchers and sophisticated investors. Consequently, stronger initial underreaction by
newswatchers promises potentially larger prots for sophisticated investors, which causes
the latter to trade more aggressively. However, since they do not know the exact fundamental
value and the total number of their competitors in the market, their higher aggressiveness
in this case leads to stronger aggregate demand and stronger subsequent price overreaction.
Theoretical predictions are symmetrical both for positive and negative news. However,
heterogeneity in investors' beliefs, and hence the degree of underreaction by newswatchers,
is likely to be greater after positive news. The reasoning behind is that a greater fraction
of news is incorporated in stock prices before a positive earnings release and it is more
dicult for investors to agree on the interpretation of the residual news. Kothari, Shu, and
Wysocki (2009) nd that managers choose to disclose some of the positive information before
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the ocial announcement release, but do not leak any negative information. In addition,
consistent with Diamond and Verrecchia (1987), short-sale constraints prevent informed
investors, e.g. insiders, to trade on negative information before a public announcement
release, whereas margin trading for opening long positions is easier. After positive news,
greater heterogeneity in newswatchers' beliefs should therefore facilitate overcrowding and
price overreaction. After negative news, investors' beliefs are likely to be more homogeneous
- they underreact less and the probability of overcrowding is relatively low.
In the following, I explicitly test this explanation, using three proxies to measure hetero-
geneity of investors' beliefs: stock volatility, V olat, calculated as the annualized standard
deviation of daily stock returns over the calendar month; market's expectation of the stock
market volatility over the next 30 day period, captured by the V IX index; and 4OIB, the
change in the absolute value of order imbalance on the announcement day relative to its
mean in the base period. Earnings announcements of highly volatile stocks and in highly
volatile market periods should be more dicult to interpret, and should thus cause more
disagreement between unsophisticated investors. Lower values of 4OIB mean that amounts
of purchase and sale volumes become more equal on an announcement day, indicating higher
divergence in investors' opinions about news. Appendix A provides a detailed denition of
these variables.
I split the sample by the median measure of belief heterogeneity and report the results
separately for announcements with the above (High) and below (Low) median heterogeneity
of investor beliefs. I expect β3 to be more negative for announcements that belong to High
Volat, High VIX and Low 4OIB samples.
[Insert Table 10 approximately here]
Panel A of Table 10 reports the results for good news. To conserve space, I only report
the coecients for main variables of interest, but all regressions also include the vector of
previous control variables. Findings for all three measures of investors' belief heterogeneity
are in line with prior expectations: high trading aggressiveness after announcements with
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greater belief heterogeneity in High Volat, High VIX and Low 4OIB samples leads to
stronger return reversals in the long run. The economic magnitude is larger for stocks with
high past volatility (Model 1) and in highly volatile market periods (Model 3), as compared to
the benchmark case in Model (3) of Table 7. For4OIB (Model 6), the economic magnitude
is comparable to the benchmark case. After bad news, β3 is only signicant in High VIX
sample, which is consistent with previous ndings that the eect of high sell-side trading
aggressiveness is only limited to the nancial crisis period. Overall, the ndings suggest that
aggressive trading indeed leads to stronger price overreaction for announcements with greater
belief heterogeneity in the sample of good news. After bad news, splitting the sample by
dierent measures of belief heterogeneity does not play a big role, because unsophisticated
investors' beliefs tend to be more homogeneous and the probability of overcrowding by
aggressive traders is relatively low.
Another potential explanation of asymmetry in results is related to the degree of market
participants' attention after positive and negative news releases. DeHaan, Shevlin, and
Thornock (2015) show that managers choose to strategically report good news in periods of
higher attention and bad news in periods of lower attention by market participants. However,
it is not clear ex ante whether higher market attention is benecial for price eciency. If the
majority of participating sophisticated traders have better information processing skills and
anchor their trades to the new fundamental value, then higher attention from their side should
benet incorporation of information into prices, i.e. reduce the PEAD drift. In contrast,
if higher market attention is to a large extent driven by uninformed sophisticated investors
that engage in positive feedback trading, then it should rather facilitate overcrowding and
price overreaction after earnings releases. By the same logic, low market attention can be
either benecial or detrimental to price eciency, dependent on the composition of traders
on the announcement day.
Following DeHaan, Shevlin, and Thornock (2015), I examine two specic times of earn-
ings releases that are supposed to attract higher levels of market attention: announcements
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released on non-busy reporting days and those released on non-Fridays.31 A reporting day
is classied as busy if more than ve other rms are releasing their earnings on the same
day. Panel A of Table 11 reports the results for good news and Panel B for bad news. As
before, I only report coecients on main variables of interest to conserve space.
[Insert Table 11 approximately here]
Model (1) displays the results for announcements released on non-busy reporting days
that are supposed to attract higher market attention. Model (2) presents the corresponding
results for busy reporting days. After good news, β3 is negative and signicant only in
the sample of non-busy days. Likewise, it is only signicant in the sample of non-Friday
announcements (Model 3), suggesting stronger price overreaction after good news on days
with higher market attention. These ndings are consistent with high market attention after
good news being largely driven by uninformed investors that engage in positive feedback
trading.
After bad news, β3 is positive and signicant for busy reporting days, consistent with re-
duction in the PEAD drift due to aggressive selling after the announcement release. Whereas
market attention is generally lower on busy days, this nding suggests that aggressive selling
on these days is largely driven by sophisticated investors with better information processing
skills. Interestingly, β3 is also weakly signicant at the 10% level for non-Friday announce-
ments that are supposed to attract higher levels of market attention. However, after explicit
testing of both proxies, DeHaan, Shevlin, and Thornock (2015) report that attention appears
to be the same on Fridays, compared to other weekdays, which questions the validity of this
market attention measure.
Overall, aggressive trading on announcement days with high market attention can be
rather attributed to uninformed sophisticated investors that engage in positive feedback
trading. After good news, higher attention from their side leads to a more pronounced price
31I do not examine their third measure of market attention, based on announcements outside of trading
hours, because my sample consists only of announcements released during the trading hours of US exchanges.
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overreaction. After bad news, lower attention from their side is rather benecial for price
eciency, resulting in a weaker PEAD drift.32
5 Conclusions
In this paper, I use trading aggressiveness in the periods immediately after earnings re-
leases to empirically test predictions of Stein's (2009) crowded-trade theory. Specically, I
measure trading aggressiveness as the proportion of volume traded with intermarket sweep
orders (ISOs) split across multiple exchanges, the most aggressive orders available on the US
markets. ISOs represent an exemption from the Order Protection Rule of the Regulation
National Market System and are executed more quickly than standard market orders.
Consistent with Stein's (2009) predictions, my ndings suggest that high trading aggres-
siveness in post-announcement periods leads to price overreaction: a stronger initial price
reaction of more aggressively traded stocks is oset by their long-term return reversals, sig-
naling crowding of aggressive traders after earnings releases. Interestingly, price overreaction
is only observed in the sample of good news. By contrast, after bad news, aggressive sale
orders push prices in the direction of the fundamental value, reducing the PEAD drift.
The asymmetry in results can be explained by greater heterogeneity of unsophisticated
investors' beliefs after good news. Since a greater fraction of previously available positive in-
formation is priced in before the announcement release, it is more dicult for unsophisticated
investors to agree on the interpretation of the residual news. Therefore, their initial under-
reaction to positive news is likely to be stronger. In Stein (2009), stronger underreaction by
newswatchers implies potentially larger prots for sophisticated traders, causing them to
trade more aggressively. More aggressive sophisticated traders generate stronger aggregate
demand and a stronger subsequent price overreaction. In support of this theoretical predic-
tion, I show that price overreaction is stronger after positive announcements with greater
32Tables IA3 and IA4 of the Internet Appendix reproduce the analysis of two explanations for asymmetry
in the observed results in Tables 10 and 11, using I/B/E/S earnings surprise for the news classication. The
overall results are comparable to those using initial returns, but statistical signicance is weaker.
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heterogeneity in investors' beliefs, for which the initial underreaction by newswatchers is
more likely.
Another explanation relates to the degree of market participants' attention after the news
release. DeHaan, Shevlin, and Thornock (2015) show that managers choose to strategically
report good news in periods of higher attention and bad news in periods of lower attention by
market participants. However, the eect of market attention on price eciency depends on
the composition of traders on an announcement day. Overall, my ndings suggest that price
overreaction after good news is stronger on days with higher market attention, consistent with
higher market attention being largely driven by uninformed investors engaging in positive
feedback trading. After bad news, lower attention from their side results in a weaker PEAD
drift, improving price eciency.
Importantly, earnings announcements are to a large extent scheduled and anticipated
by the market. The destabilizing eects of aggressive trading on stock prices are likely
to be even more pronounced during unexpected information releases when uncertainty and
heterogeneity of investors' beliefs reach their peak levels. Therefore, better understanding
of risks arising from an extensive usage of aggressive orders after information releases is
important for regulators to ensure stability of nancial markets.
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%ISOV ol Proportion of ISO volume: the ratio of trading volume that
is executed with intermarket sweep orders (ISOs) to the total
trading volume within a given trading interval
TAQ
∆ISOV ol The change in the proportion of ISO volume within a given
trading interval on the announcement day relative to its




Proportion of ISO purchase (sale) volume: the ratio of pur-
chase (sale) volume that is executed with intermarket sweep





The change in the proportion of ISO purchase (sale) volume
within a given trading interval on the announcement day
relative to its mean, calculated over the same interval in the
base period
TAQ
Beta The systematic risk of the rm, estimated as the slope from
the market model, using the equally-weighted CRSP index as
the market portfolio. The estimation period for parameters
is (-264, -64).
CRSP
BHAR(t;s) Buy-and-hold abnormal return over event days t to s relative
to the earnings announcement date. BHARs are estimated
from the market model, using the equally-weighted CRSP
index as the market portfolio. The estimation period for
parameters is (-264, -64).
CRSP
Depth Sum of shares available at the NBBO bid and NBBO ask (in
hundreds of shares)
TAQ





1, if the proportion of multi-exchange ISO purchase (sale)
volume, traded within the rst two hours following an an-
nouncement release, %ISOBuyMultiEx (%ISOSellMultiEx),
is above the median of the proportion of multi-exchange ISO
purchase (sale) volume distribution for stocks in my sample,
and zero otherwise
TAQ
LnMCap Natural logarithm of market value two days before the an-
nouncement (in $ million)
CRSP
MCap Market value of equity two days before the announcement
(in $ million)
CRSP
MTB Ratio of market value of equity two days before the an-
nouncement to book value of equity at the end of the previ-
ous quarter (item ceqq)
CRSP
Compustat
OIB Absolute value of order imbalance, calculated as OIB =
|BuyV ol−SellV ol|
BuyV ol+SellV ol , where BuyV ol (SellV ol) denotes purchase
(sale) volume within a given trading interval
TAQ
∆OIB The change in the absolute value of order imbalance on an
announcement day relative to its mean in the base period
TAQ
OIBSPY Daily market order imbalance, calculated as the OIB for




Price impact of a buy (sell) trade, dened as PrcImp+t·s =
2 |Qt+s −Qt| /Qt, where Qt+s is the NBBO midpoint price
of the stock after s seconds
TAQ
RealV ar [−5s] Realized variance over the ve seconds prior to ISO execu-
tion, calculated as the sum of the squared high-frequency
NBBO quote midpoint returns over ve seconds before the
transaction:
RealV ar [−5s] =
−5∑
t=−1
(log Qt − log Qt−1)2
TAQ
QSpr The relative quoted spread, prevailing at the time of trade
execution. Dened as the dierence between the NBBO ask
and the NBBO bid, scaled by their average; observations




QSprSPY Daily market quoted spread, calculated as the average of rel-
ative quoted spread (QSpr) for SPDR S&P 500 ETF (ticker




Size of a purchase (sale) transaction (in shares) TAQ
VIX Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index,
a measure of the implied volatility of S&P 500 at-the-money
options that represents the market's expectation of the stock





Volat Stock volatility, calculated as the annualized standard devi-
ation of daily stock returns over the calendar month
CRSP






I use data lters to clean trade and quote data, as described by Holden and Jacobsen
(2014). For each second, I calculate the National Best Bid and Oer (NBBO) with the help
of Hasbrouck's (2010) algorithm.33 First, the prevailing quote at the end of each second
is identied for each exchange. Afterward, the best (maximum) bid (Bt) and the best
(minimum) ask (At) is chosen across all exchange quotes. The midpoint price is calculated
as the average of the prevailing bid and ask quotes: Qt = (At +Bt)/2. If an abnormal quote
enters the NBBO, the NBBO is set to missing. As recommended by Holden and Jacobsen
(2014), NBBO quotes that are locked or crossed are deleted. I also record the total sum of
shares available at the best bid and the best ask as well as the number of exchanges that
quote the best bid and the best ask.
Trades are merged to the NBBO that prevails one second before the trade execution.34 I
use Lee and Ready's (1991) algorithm to identify the direction of a trade. Trades with the
transaction price (Pt) above the midpoint price (Pt > Qt) are identied as buyer-initiated
transactions, and those with the transaction price below the midpoint price (Pt < Qt) as
seller-initiated transactions. If the transaction price is equal to the midpoint price, the
current transaction price is compared with the previous transaction price. If Pt < Pt−1, I
consider a trade to be seller-initiated; if Pt > Pt−1, I consider it to be buyer-initiated. Should
the two prices be equal, the trade is left as unclassied. Papers by Odders-White (2000),
Ellis, Michaely, and O'Hara (2000), and Theissen (2001) show that only 72%-85% of trades
are correctly classied as buyer- or seller-initiated with Lee and Ready's (1991) algorithm.
However, the missclassication is fairly symmetric and thus should not bias any results of
this paper.
33I would like to thank Joel Hasbrouck for making the SAS code of his algorithm available at
http://people.stern.nyu.edu/jhasbrou/
34Chakravarty et al. (2012) try 0, 10, 50, 500, 1,000 and 5,000 millisecond lags and nd that the highest
percentage of ISO and non-ISO trades occurs at the quotes if merged with a lag of 1,000 milliseconds.
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Figure 1: Changes in the Proportion of ISO volume on Earnings Announcement Dates. This
gure displays the mean percentage changes in the proportion of ISO volume throughout the announcement
day, calculated as the dierences between the proportion of ISO volume traded within the category on the
announcement day and its mean in the base period. Changes are measured over 10-minute event intervals,
with interval 0 representing the 10-minute interval following an earnings announcement release. The solid
line shows the mean percentage changes in the proportion of ISO volume for single-exchange ISO trades,
and the dashed line for multi-exchange ISO trades.
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Table 1: Sample Construction. This table shows the sample selection of the US earnings announcements
that take place within trading hours (9.30-16.00 EST) from October 1, 2007 to December 31, 2017. The
data source for dates and times of the earnings announcements is the Institutional Brokers Estimate System
(I/B/E/S). I require each rm to exist in the intersection set of I/B/E/S and CRSP.
Data Filters Events Firms
Initial sample 10,140 3,775
Stock traded on an announcement day 9,509 3,559
Intraday transaction data available on TAQ 7,922 3,042
Closing price not less than $2 6,870 2,745
Not more than one announcement of each
rm per day
6,843 2,744
Trading data exists for previous 2 months 6,811 2,734
Exclude active stocks that have more than
10 trades per minute
6,229 2,481
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Table 2: Summary statistics. This table presents summary statistics for the nal sample of earnings
announcements. Data on market capitalization,MCap, average daily volume traded (in thousands of shares),
Volume, and annualized volatility of daily returns, Volat , are from CRSP. Quarterly data on the book value
of equity, used to calculate the market-to-book ratio, MTB , are obtained from Compustat. Buy-and-hold
abnormal returns around earnings announcement dates (BHARs) are estimated with the market model, using
daily return data from CRSP and the equally-weighted CRSP market index as the market portfolio. The
estimation period for the parameters is (-264, -64). The stock is required to have at least 100 observations in
the estimation period. Beta is the slope from the market model. Daily averages of quoted spread, Qspr, the
absolute value of order imbalance, OIB, total depth at the best bid and the best ask (in hundreds of shares),
Depth, and realized variance over the ve seconds before trade execution, RealV ar [−5s], are calculated from
the NYSE TAQ database. See Appendix A for a detailed description of variable denitions.
N Mean Std 25% 50% 75%
MCap (in mln $) 6,229 1106 2822 81 260 888
Volume (in 000's) 6,229 254 400 13 72 315
Volat 6,229 .51 .32 .28 .43 .64
MTB 6,229 1.9 2.7 .44 1.2 2
Beta 5,952 .93 .61 .46 .92 1.3
BHAR(-23;-2) 5,952 -.0082 .13 -.069 -.0067 .05
BHAR(0;1) 5,952 -.00045 .072 -.03 -.000026 .03
BHAR(2;128) 5,952 -.081 .41 -.25 -.044 .14
QSpr 6,229 .014 .02 .0019 .0048 .016
OIB 6,229 .25 .27 .065 .16 .33
Depth 6,229 29 92 7 11 23
RealV ar [−5s] 6,229 .058 .068 .014 .034 .073
Table 3: Trading with Aggressive Orders in the Base Period. Panel A of this table shows the
split of the total proportion of ISO volume by four price-exchange categories in the base period, consisting
of days [-40, -2]. I aggregate all ISOs that occur in the same second and in the same direction in one
ISO trade, and further assign aggregated ISO trades to four categories: ISO trades executed on a single
exchange at the same price (SameEx-SamePrc); on a single exchange at multiple prices (SameEx-MultiPrc);
on multiple exchanges at the same price (MultiEx-SamePrc); and on multiple exchanges at multiple prices
(MultiEx-MultiPrc). The daily proportion of ISO volume within a given category is calculated as the ratio
of the daily ISO volume traded within the category to the overall volume traded during the day (both with
ISOs and non-ISOs). Panel B of this table summarizes dierences in sizes and price impacts of ISO and
non-ISO trades, separately for purchases and sales. The rst two columns report dierences between ISO and
non-ISO trades executed on a single exchange (SameEx ). The third and fourth columns report dierences
between trades executed at multiple exchanges (MultiEx ). The last column reports dierences between ISOs
across two exchange categories. See Appendix A for a detailed description of variable denitions. The table
also reports p-values of the t-test for the null-hypothesis that the dierence in means equals zero. * denotes
statistical signicance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
Panel A: %ISO volume split
SameEx MultiEx Total
SamePrc 20.66% 5.88% 26.54%
MultiPrc 2.32% 5.92% 8.24%
Total 22.98% 11.80% 34.78%
Panel B: Dierences in ISO and non-ISO trades






SizeBuy 208 275 *** 627 668 *** 418 ***
PrcImpBuy+1s 0.09 0.06 *** 0.13 0.11 *** 0.039 ***
PrcImpBuy+60s 0.13 0.10 *** 0.16 0.14 *** 0.034 ***
SizeSell 221 315 *** 656 695 *** 435 ***
PrcImpSell+1s 0.10 0.07 *** 0.14 0.11 *** 0.040 ***
PrcImpSell+60s 0.09 0.07 *** 0.11 0.09 *** 0.019 ***
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Table 4: Trading Aggressiveness on Announcement Days. Panel A of this table shows changes in
the proportion of ISO volume (4ISOV ol) on an announcement day by four price-exchange categories. I
aggregate all ISOs that occur in the same second and in the same direction in one ISO trade, and further
assign aggregated ISO trades to four categories: ISO trades executed on a single exchange at the same price
(SameEx-SamePrc); on a single exchange at multiple prices (SameEx-MultiPrc); on multiple exchanges at
the same price (MultiEx-SamePrc); and on multiple exchanges at multiple prices (MultiEx-MultiPrc). The
change for each category is calculated as the dierence between the proportion of ISO volume traded within
the category on an announcement day and its mean in the base period, consisting of days [-40, -2]. Panel B
shows changes in the proportion of multi-exchange ISO volume (4ISOV olMultiEx) on announcement days
by news direction. Announcements in the top 33% of BHAR(0; 1) distribution are dened as good news,
those in the bottom 33% as bad news, and the remainder as those with largely no news. See Appendix
A for a detailed description of variable denitions. The table also reports p-values of the t-test for the
null-hypothesis that changes in 4ISOV olMultiEx equal zero. * denotes statistical signicance at the 10%
level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
Panel A: ∆ISOV ol on Announcement Day
SameEx MultiEx Total
SamePrc -0.49% ** -0.26% *** -0.75% ***
MultiPrc 0.46% *** 1.48% *** 1.94% ***
Total -0.03% 1.22% *** 1.19% ***
Panel B: ∆ISOV olMultiEx by News Direction
Good None Bad
4ISOV ol 1.90% *** 0.96% *** 1.85% ***
4ISOBuy 2.71% *** 0.96% *** 1.09% ***
4ISOSell 1.40% *** 0.95% *** 2.40% ***
4Buy −4Sell 1.31% *** 0.01% -1.31% ***
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Table 5: Determinants of Intraday ISO Trading Volume. This table reports results of panel data
OLS regressions with the proportion of ISO volume (%ISOvol) split by exchange category as the dependent
variable. One observation represents a 10-minute trading interval for a stock. Models (1) and (3) analyze the
base period, which consists of 39 trading days before an announcement day, from day -40 to day -2. Models
(2) and (4) analyze trading with ISOs on announcement days. See Appendix A for a detailed description
of variable denitions. All regressions include day-xed eects and intraday dummies for each half-hour of
the trading day. Standard errors allow for double-clustering at the rm and day level. T-statistics of the
two-tailed t-test with the null-hypothesis of a coecient equaling zero are reported in parentheses below
each coecient. P-values of the two-tailed t-test with the null-hypothesis of a coecient equaling zero are
reported in form of asterisks to the right of each coecient. * denotes statistical signicance at the 10%
level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. I also report the number of observations (N) and R2 for
each regression.
%ISOVolMultiEx %ISOVolSameEx
Base Event Base Event
(1) (2) (3) (4)
L.Volume 0.2298 *** 0.1468 *** -0.7593 *** -0.3133 ***
(7.62) (6.45) (-9.85) (-6.18)
RealV ar [−5s] 0.0114 *** 0.0161 *** -0.0325 *** -0.0288 ***
(5.91) (4.60) (-15.86) (-8.44)
L.OIB -0.0027 *** -0.0054 *** 0.0011 -0.0008
(-4.68) (-2.91) (1.13) (-0.38)
QSpr 1.0876 *** 0.2171 4.2372 *** 2.9204 ***
(3.18) (0.52) (15.41) (7.67)
Depth -0.0004 *** -0.0001 -0.0002 *** -0.0001 **
(-4.36) (-1.45) (-3.64) (-2.04)
N 3,238,606 90,148 4,716,757 124,701
R-squared 0.02 0.09 0.05 0.12
Daytime FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Day FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 6: Trading Aggressiveness and Price Dynamics: Propensity Score Matching. This table
presents results of propensity score matching analysis, with matching factors including market capitalization,
MCap, stock's volatility, Volat, and average daily trading volume, Volume. Announcements in the top 33%
of BHAR(0; 1) distribution are dened as good news and those in the bottom 33% as bad news. Within
each news category, I match stocks with high trading aggressiveness (High TA stocks) and low trading
aggressiveness (Low TA stocks) separately on announcement days (Event) and non-announcement days
(Non−Event), using nearest-neighbor propensity score matching. High TA stocks for the good (bad) news
sample are dened as stocks, for which the proportion of multi-exchange ISO purchase (sale) volume within
the rst two hours of the announcement release is in the top 50% of its distribution (HighTABuy/Sell = 1).
Low TA stocks are the corresponding stocks in the bottom 50% of its distribution (HighTABuy/Sell = 0).
The upper panel of this table reports the cross-sectional averages of BHAR(0;1) for High TA and Low TA
samples, separately for good news and bad news. The middle panel reports the corresponding statistics
for the three-month buy-and-hold abnormal return, BHAR(2;64), and the lower panel - for the six-month
buy-and-hold abnormal return, BHAR(2;128). The t-statistics of the two-sided t-test on the equality of the
means between High TA and Low TA stocks are reported in parentheses in the last row of each panel.
Good News Bad News
BHAR(0;1) Event Non-Event Di Event Non-Event Di
High TABuy/Sell 7.90% -0.18% 8.08% -7.78% -0.15% -7.63%
Low TABuy/Sell 6.19% 0.03% 6.16% -6.67% -0.11% -6.56%
Di 1.71% -0.21% 1.92% -1.11% -0.04% -1.07%
t-stat (4.54) (-1.74) (4.85) (-3.69) (-0.26) (-3.20)
Good News Bad News
BHAR(2;64) Event Non-Event Di Event Non-Event Di
High TABuy/Sell -2.74% 6.24% -8.98% -4.57% -13.17% 8.60%
Low TABuy/Sell 0.89% 5.03% -4.14% -6.66% -11.59% 4.93%
Di -3.63% 1.21% -4.84% 2.09% -1.58% 3.67%
t-stat (-2.78) (1.24) (-2.98) (1.17) (-1.83) (1.86)
Good News Bad News
BHAR(2;128) Event Non-Event Di Event Non-Event Di
High TABuy/Sell -9.61% -0.83% -8.78% -11.53% -21.73% 10.20%
Low TABuy/Sell -1.16% 0.21% -1.37% -14.77% -17.82% 3.05%
Di -8.45% -1.04% -7.41% 3.24% -3.91% 7.15%
t-stat (-3.52) (-0.65) (-2.66) (1.75) (-2.36) (2.88)
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Table 7: Trading Aggressiveness and Price Dynamics: Multivariate Analysis. Models (1) and (2)
of this table present results of panel OLS regressions with the two-day buy-and-hold abnormal return over
days 0 and 1, BHAR(0; 1), as the dependent variable. Models (3) and (4) report results with the six-month
post-announcement return, BHAR (2; 128), as the dependent variable. The news classication in Panel A is
based on BHAR(0; 1). In Panel B, the news classication is based on the I/B/E/S earnings surprise, which
is calculated as the dierence between the earnings and the consensus forecast, scaled by the price two days
prior to the earnings announcement. All regressions include observations for non-earnings announcement
days -40, -30 and -20 that represent the control group. See Appendix A for a detailed description of variable
denitions. All explanatory variables are standardized. All regressions include weekday- and monthyear-xed
eects, with standard errors double-clustered at the rm and day level. T-statistics of the two-tailed t-test
with the null-hypothesis of a coecient equaling zero are reported in parentheses below each coecient.
Panel A: News Classication: BHAR(0;1)
BHAR(0;1) BHAR(2;128)
Good Bad Good Bad
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Event 0.066 *** -0.065 *** -0.015 0.044 **
(23.74) (-25.78) (-0.93) (2.46)
HighTABuy -0.000 0.008
(-0.07) (0.43)




Event ·HighTASell -0.010 *** 0.046 *
(-2.62) (1.68)
LnMCap -0.002 -0.002 -0.077 *** -0.045 ***
(-1.63) (-1.21) (-3.58) (-2.94)
MTB -0.000 0.000 -0.043 *** -0.042 ***
(-0.39) (0.32) (-3.08) (-3.62)
Beta 0.003 ** -0.002 0.020 0.000
(2.39) (-1.36) (1.09) (0.02)
BHAR(−23;−2) -0.003 -0.003 ** 0.100 *** 0.110 ***
(-1.64) (-2.38) (7.03) (7.26)
V olat 0.011 *** -0.002 -0.058 *** -0.067 ***
(3.32) (-1.35) (-2.81) (-4.10)
QSprSPY -0.002 0.011 ** -0.002 -0.007
(-0.49) (2.10) (-0.07) (-0.17)
OIBSPY -0.000 -0.000 0.003 -0.000
(-0.44) (-0.36) (0.60) (-0.08)
Constant 0.001 0.000 -0.005 -0.128 ***
(0.56) (0.04) (-0.28) (-4.94)
N 7,050 6,832 7,050 6,832
R-squared 0.23 0.20 0.14 0.15
Weekday FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Panel B: News Classication: IBES Earnings Surprise
BHAR(0;1) BHAR(2;128)
Good Bad Good Bad
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Event 0.020 *** -0.010 ** -0.006 0.003
(7.08) (-2.29) (-0.27) (0.13)
HighTABuy -0.000 0.018
(-0.05) (0.61)




Event ·HighTASell -0.014 ** 0.046
(-2.15) (1.26)
LnMCap -0.001 -0.003 -0.083 *** -0.022
(-0.95) (-1.61) (-3.09) (-0.90)
MTB 0.000 -0.003 ** -0.038 * -0.046 **
(0.13) (-2.09) (-1.71) (-2.00)
Beta 0.001 -0.001 0.069 *** -0.023
(0.62) (-0.36) (3.01) (-1.11)
BHAR(−23;−2) -0.003 * -0.001 0.116 *** 0.103 ***
(-1.88) (-0.58) (6.59) (6.05)
V olat 0.008 ** 0.001 -0.027 0.005
(2.34) (0.18) (-0.97) (0.17)
QSprSPY 0.002 0.013 0.049 0.006
(0.31) (1.44) (0.76) (0.14)
OIBSPY 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.001
(0.34) (0.40) (0.19) (-0.12)
Constant 0.004 -0.001 0.009 -0.0841 ***
(1.42) (-0.14) (0.32) (-2.63)
N 3,577 3,037 3,577 3,037
R-squared 0.08 0.06 0.19 0.23
Weekday FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 8: Trading Aggressiveness and Price Dynamics: Subsample Analysis. This table presents
results of panel OLS regressions with the six-month post-announcement return, BHAR (2; 128), as the
dependent variable. Good news is dened as the top 33% and bad news as the bottom 33% of BHAR(0; 1).
Models (1) and (2) present results for the nancial crisis period of 2007-2008, whereas Models (3) and (4)
present results for 2009-2017. All regressions include observations for non-earnings announcement days -40,
-30 and -20 that represent the control group. See Appendix A for a detailed description of variable denitions.
All explanatory variables are standardized. All regressions include weekday- and monthyear-xed eects,
with standard errors double-clustered at the rm and day level. T-statistics of the two-tailed t-test with the
null-hypothesis of a coecient equaling zero are reported in parentheses below each coecient.
BHAR(2;128) Crisis: 2007-2008 Non-Crisis: 2009-2017
Good Bad Good Bad
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Event 0.004 0.044 * -0.023 0.042
(0.18) (1.95) (-1.28) (1.57)
HighTABuy 0.001 0.016
(0.02) (0.91)




Event ·HighTASell 0.068 * 0.045
(1.72) (1.31)
LnMCap -0.095 *** -0.057 ** -0.082 *** -0.059 ***
(-2.72) (-2.42) (-4.38) (-2.94)
MTB -0.051 ** -0.057 *** -0.036 ** -0.028 *
(-2.30) (-3.31) (-2.52) (-1.82)
Beta 0.022 -0.027 -0.006 -0.016
(0.79) (-1.07) (-0.34) (-0.63)
BHAR(−23;−2) 0.110 *** 0.109 *** 0.094 *** 0.117 ***
(5.90) (7.00) (7.15) (5.67)
V olat -0.047 * -0.049 ** -0.043 ** -0.075 ***
(-1.92) (-2.25) (-2.24) (-3.97)
QSprSPY -0.018 -0.042 0.003 0.062
(-0.41) (-1.05) (0.08) (0.65)
OIBSPY 0.009 0.004 0.001 -0.004
(0.65) (0.31) (0.22) (-0.66)
Constant -0.050 -0.109 * -0.005 -0.122 ***
(-1.19) (-1.94) (-0.30) (-2.76)
N 2,455 2,507 4,595 4,325
R-squared 0.11 0.15 0.15 0.18
Weekday FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 9: Trading Aggressiveness and Price Dynamics: Robustness Checks. This table presents
robustness checks of main results for good news in Panel A and bad news in Panel B. The good news is
dened as the top 33% and bad news as the bottom 33% of BHAR(0; 1). Model (1) reports results with
the three-month post-announcement return, BHAR (2; 64), as the dependent variable. For the remaining
models, the dependent variable is BHAR (2; 128). Models (2) and (3) report results with alternative
measures of HighTABuy and HighTASell: in model (2) it is based on the proportion of multi-exchange ISO
volume traded within the rst hour of the announcement release, [0;1]; in model (3) - on the proportion
of multi-exchange ISO volume over the period following the rst two hours after the announcement release
until the end of the trading day, [3+]. Model (4) reports results for the sample of stocks that excludes
active stocks with more than 5 trades per minute. Model (5) includes only the non-earnings announcement
day -40 as the control group. See Appendix A for a detailed description of other variable denitions. All
explanatory variables are standardized. All regressions include weekday- and monthyear-xed eects, with
standard errors double-clustered at the rm and day level. T-statistics of the two-tailed t-test with the
null-hypothesis of a coecient equaling zero are reported in parentheses below each coecient.
Panel A: Good News
BHAR(2;64) Multi-Ex ISOVol Exclude Control
[0;1] [3+] active5 day [-40]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Event -0.031 *** -0.017 -0.033 ** -0.014 0.001
(-2.64) (-1.12) (-2.42) (-0.88) (0.08)
HighTABuy 0.014 0.008 0.009 0.010 0.013
(1.33) (0.44) (0.43) (0.50) (0.49)
Event ·HighTABuy -0.041 *** -0.064 *** -0.042 * -0.075 *** -0.078 **
(-2.63) (-2.77) (-1.81) (-2.81) (-2.44)
LnMCap -0.048 *** -0.077 *** -0.079 *** -0.087 *** -0.078 ***
(-4.28) (-3.60) (-3.74) (-3.34) (-3.46)
MTB -0.019 *** -0.043 *** -0.043 *** -0.035 ** -0.041 ***
(-2.95) (-3.09) (-3.09) (-2.23) (-2.98)
Beta 0.028 *** 0.020 0.019 0.029 0.018
(3.63) (1.08) (1.05) (1.49) (0.97)
BHAR(−23;−2) 0.041 *** 0.100 *** 0.101 *** 0.105 *** 0.093 ***
(5.66) (7.03) (7.04) (6.90) (7.76)
V olat -0.015 -0.058 *** -0.058 *** -0.057 *** -0.070 ***
(-1.58) (-2.81) (-2.82) (-2.67) (-3.49)
QSprSPY 0.027 -0.003 -0.000 -0.002 -0.006
(1.05) (-0.11) (-0.01) (-0.08) (-0.14)
OIBSPY 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.009
(1.42) (0.58) (0.61) (0.52) (1.02)
Constant 0.028 *** -0.005 -0.006 -0.011 -0.012
(2.66) (-0.30) (-0.35) (-0.58) (-0.50)
N 7,050 7,050 7,050 6,311 3,636
R-squared 0.11 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13
Weekday FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Bad News
BHAR(2;64) Multi-Ex ISOVol Exclude Control
[0;1] [3+] active5 day [-40]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Event 0.061 *** 0.037 ** 0.058 *** 0.042 ** 0.021
(4.10) (2.00) (3.98) (2.27) (1.00)
HighTASell -0.003 -0.023 -0.026 -0.015 -0.055 *
(-0.36) (-1.28) (-1.03) (-0.74) (-1.89)
Event ·HighTASell 0.020 0.065 ** 0.018 0.053 * 0.079 **
(1.19) (2.27) (0.66) (1.78) (2.38)
LnMCap -0.020 ** -0.045 *** -0.043 *** -0.067 *** -0.047 ***
(-2.26) (-2.90) (-2.82) (-3.53) (-2.91)
MTB -0.021 *** -0.042 *** -0.042 *** -0.040 *** -0.037 ***
(-3.63) (-3.63) (-3.61) (-3.12) (-3.38)
Beta -0.005 0.000 0.001 0.011 0.001
(-0.61) (0.02) (0.05) (0.60) (0.04)
BHAR(−23;−2) 0.048 *** 0.110 *** 0.110 *** 0.120 *** 0.099 ***
(6.60) (7.26) (7.26) (7.31) (6.91)
V olat -0.014 -0.067 *** -0.067 *** -0.080 *** -0.077 ***
(-1.34) (-4.10) (-4.07) (-4.82) (-4.43)
QSprSPY 0.020 -0.006 -0.007 -0.001 0.059
(0.88) (-0.15) (-0.18) (-0.02) (1.58)
OIBSPY -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.003 0.004
(-0.00) (-0.12) (-0.05) (-0.51) (0.48)
Constant -0.100 *** -0.127 *** -0.128 *** -0.134 *** -0.099 ***
(-7.15) (-4.91) (-5.04) (-4.75) (-2.83)
N 6,832 6,832 6,832 6,055 3,523
R-squared 0.12 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.14
Weekday FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 10: Heterogeneous Beliefs and Price Overreaction. This table presents results of panel OLS
regressions with BHAR(2; 128) as the dependent variable. Good news (Panel A) is dened as the top 33%
and bad news (Panel B) as the bottom 33% of BHAR(0; 1). Models (1) and (2) estimate eects of trading
aggressiveness conditional on stock volatility (Volat), Models (3) and (4) conditional on the VIX index
(VIX ), and Models (5) and (6) conditional on the change in absolute order imbalance on the announcement
day (4OIB). All regressions include observations for non-earnings announcement days -40, -30 and -20
that represent the control group. See Appendix A for a detailed description of variable denitions. All
explanatory variables are standardized. All regressions include control variables LnMcap, MTB, Beta,
BHAR(−23;−2),V olat,QsprSPY and OIBSPY as well as weekday- and monthyear-xed eects. Standard
errors are double-clustered at the rm and day level. T-statistics of the two-tailed t-test with the null-
hypothesis of a coecient equaling zero are reported in parentheses below each coecient.
Panel A: Good News
Volat VIX ∆OIB
High Low High Low High Low
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Event -0.003 -0.030 ** -0.003 -0.046 ** 0.023 -0.053 *
(-0.11) (-2.04) (-0.12) (-2.13) (0.77) (-1.87)
HighTABuy 0.022 -0.006 0.013 -0.004 0.001 0.020
(0.70) (-0.47) (0.43) (-0.19) (0.04) (0.77)
Event ·HighTABuy -0.100 ** -0.040 ** -0.098 ** -0.031 -0.058 * -0.073 **
(-2.43) (-2.06) (-2.33) (-1.06) (-1.73) (-1.99)
N 3,868 3,176 3,672 3,370 3,470 3,519
R-squared 0.15 0.23 0.13 0.19 0.16 0.14
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Bad News
Volat VIX ∆OIB
High Low High Low High Low
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Event 0.039 0.071 *** 0.027 0.048 * 0.044 0.049 *
(1.59) (2.97) (0.93) (1.87) (1.33) (1.72)
HighTASell -0.011 -0.014 -0.047 ** 0.004 -0.013 -0.017
(-0.36) (-0.96) (-2.35) (0.15) (-0.52) (-0.67)
Event ·HighTASell 0.058 -0.008 0.084 ** 0.010 0.039 0.044
(1.38) (-0.25) (2.57) (0.21) (0.86) (1.17)
N 4,054 2,773 3,755 3,070 3,402 3,358
R-squared 0.17 0.22 0.18 0.16 0.17 0.17
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 11: Market Attention and Price Overreaction. This table presents results of panel OLS
regressions with BHAR(2; 128) as the dependent variable. Good news (Panel A) is dened as the top
33% and bad news (Panel B) as the bottom 33% of BHAR(0; 1). Models (1) and (2) estimate eects of
trading aggressiveness conditional on the business of the reporting day. A reporting day is classied as
busy if there were more than ve earnings announcements released on the same day, and as non-busy
otherwise. Models (3) and (4) estimate eects of trading aggressiveness separately for Friday and non-
Friday releases. All regressions include observations for non-earnings announcement days -40, -30 and -20
that represent the control group. See Appendix A for a detailed description of variable denitions. All
explanatory variables are standardized. All regressions include control variables LnMcap, MTB, Beta,
BHAR(−23;−2),V olat,QsprSPY and OIBSPY as well as weekday- and monthyear-xed eects. Standard
errors are double-clustered at the rm and day level. T-statistics of the two-tailed t-test with the null-
hypothesis of a coecient equaling zero are reported in parentheses below each coecient.
Panel A: Good News
Non-Busy Day Busy Day Non-Friday EA Friday EA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Event 0.003 -0.022 -0.022 -0.054
(0.09) (-1.18) (-1.07) (-0.27)
HighTABuy 0.031 -0.006 0.013 0.001
(1.05) (-0.26) (0.69) (0.03)
Event ·HighTABuy -0.113 *** -0.042 -0.080 *** -0.078
(-2.61) (-1.54) (-2.97) (-1.37)
N 2,419 4,631 5,830 1,220
R-squared 0.24 0.12 0.17 0.18
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Bad News
Non-Busy Day Busy Day Non-Friday EA Friday EA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Event 0.054 0.047 ** 0.030 0.056
(1.47) (2.33) (1.31) (0.32)
HighTASell 0.015 -0.027 -0.025 0.037
(0.46) (-1.23) (-1.35) (0.61)
Event ·HighTASell -0.009 0.064 ** 0.054 * -0.013
(-0.17) (1.98) (1.81) (-0.21)
N 2,291 4,541 5,736 1,096
R-squared 0.24 0.15 0.17 0.35
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
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